[tor-dev] Desired exit node diversity

Tim Wilson-Brown - teor teor2345 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 24 22:33:17 UTC 2015

> On 24 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Thomas White <thomaswhite at riseup.net> wrote:
> Signed PGP part
> Could we perhaps expand the contact information field in some way? One
> thing I was pondering a while ago was a social contact, not just an
> email address. I raised a very brief point about this with Virgil in
> Paris last year, but I think I made it very poorly at the time as I
> just come up with it on the spot.
> To assign an email address is good for email communications and using
> PGP and so forth, but also allowing another handle such as a Twitter
> username would be a way to create further credibility of diversity.
> For example, my following on Twitter is quite diverse and it would be
> hard to argue I was a government proxy or so on. If many operators
> have Twitter handles where the information and identity is public
> anyway, having a second option to tie into those social parameters
> would be more transparent in the people running those relays if they
> chose to be. For example, I have no problem in being open on some of
> the projects I am working on, and I'm sure moving into a social sphere
> could have a positive effect on Tor in general in terms of trust.
> For example, let's say the contact box lacks an email, we could see if
> there was a way for reaching out to people via Twitter to let them
> know a relay is outdated instead of private email reminders.
> Anyway I am rambling on a bit there, but my point is getting people to
> use not just email, but also tie into a twitter account or something
> of that nature would make it clearer that Tor is not run almost
> exclusively by the military or whatever, since that kind of open data
> with aliases and Twitter feeds connected to the relay ownership is
> researchable if people, like Transparency Toolkit, wanted to "check us
> out" so to speak. To verify the data, we could make Roster have a
> small verification step, just a "tweet this code to verify this is
> your account" and then Roster can store the URL to this tweet to
> maintain an independent proof that alias controls which relay, similar
> to how Keybase does it.

It would be great to do this in a way that’s independent of social media platform.

Many social media platforms have been invented and gone under in the time the Tor Network has been running.


Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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