[tor-dev] Proposal: Single onion services

Yawning Angel yawning at schwanenlied.me
Sat Sep 5 10:14:37 UTC 2015

On Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:31:15 -0600
John Brooks <john.brooks at dereferenced.net> wrote:

> > 
> > Have you considered all the implications?
> Maybe we’ve missed some - what implications are you thinking of, that
> aren’t addressed in the proposal?

I have two objections to this, one political, one technical:

 * (The political objection) While this is "cool" and probably(?)
   "funded", it seems like a poor thing to work on in terms of
   developmental priority when there are other things Hidden Service
   related that need a lot of developer attention, primarily in making
   the existing HSes more resilient against Nation State level
   adversaries (Eg: Prop. 224).

 * (The technical objection) It is overly easy for assholes[0] to censor
   Single Onion Services due to:

     it’s possible for the previous relay to guess the service you’re
     connecting to

   While such a censor would only be able to deny service to clients as
   a fraction of their relay(s) consensus weight, it's still something
   that probably should get consideration. 


Yawning Angel

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