[tor-dev] Update of prop#250: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

Jesse V kernelcorn at riseup.net
Wed Oct 28 22:04:26 UTC 2015


I'm in the midst of reworking my OnioNS design around prop250 (and the security analysis therein) and as far as I can tell these changes make sense. I like the 00:00 -> 24:00 change as it's more intuitive as you said. I was at first very concerned that you removed the majority requirement as that is the assumption made during consensus generation, but I think your argument for the new conflict resolution make sense. I'm excited that the implementation is nearly complete and I look forward to seeing it in Tor infrastructure!

Jesse V.

On 10/28/2015 10:26 AM, David Goulet wrote:
> First, period have been changed from 12:00 -> 12:00 (24 hour) to 00:00
> -> 24:00 so the protocol run is not over two days. Seemed more logical
> and less confusing :).
> Second, we've removed the need of having majority for a commit to be
> considered for the shared random computation. Yes this sounds intense!!
> so it needs your attention.

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