[tor-dev] Load Balancing in 2.7 series - incompatible with OnionBalance ?

Tom van der Woerdt info at tvdw.eu
Thu Oct 22 06:41:15 UTC 2015


> On 21 Oct 2015, at 00:18, Alec Muffett <alecm at fb.com> wrote:
> 
> So I’ve just had a conversation with dgoulet on IRC, which I will reformat and subedit here as a conversation regarding OnionBalance and issues in 2.6 and 2.7 when a recently rebooted HS publishes a fresh descriptor:
> 
> […]
> 
> alecm: consider OnionBalance which - being a bunch of daemons on a bunch of servers - will be a lot more prone to intermittent failures of 1+ daemons yielding a lot of republishing
> 
> alecm: we tend to move services around, and daemons will be killed in one place and resurrected elsewhere, and then we'll have to bundle up a new descriptor and ship it out
> 
> dgoulet: hrm so with that new 027 cache behavior, as long as the IP are usable, the descriptor will be kept, if they all become unusable, a new descriptor fetch is triggered and then those IPs will be tried
> 
> alecm: There's a mandatory refresh [of the descriptor] after N minutes?
> 
> dgoulet: we'll retry 3 times and after that all HSDir are in timeout for 15 minutes (I think, I'll have to validate) before retrying any HSDirs
> 
> alecm: I wonder if descriptors should publish a recommended TTL - [number of seconds to live before refresh]
> 
> dgoulet: yeah we have an idea for a "revision-counter" in the descriptor being incremented at each new version for the 24 hours period
> 
> dgoulet: a TTL could be useful for load balancing though!
> 
> alecm: so, here's a scenario: imagine that we run 10 daemons,
> 
> alecm: call these daemons: A B C D E F G H I J - they all have random onion addresses
> 
> alecm: we steal one IP from each daemon, and bundle the 10 stolen IPs together to make an onionbalance site descriptor and publish it
> 
> alecm: people pull that descriptor, it's quite popular
> 
> alecm: we then lose power in a datacentre, which takes out half of our onions - say, A through E
> 
> alecm: we reboot the datacentre and restart A-E merely 10 minutes later
> 
> alecm: everyone who has already loaded our onionbalance site descriptor tests A B C D E and finds them all dead, because the old IPs for A-E are invalid
> 
> alecm: so they all move to F G H I J - which get overloaded even though (new) A B C D E are back up
> 
> alecm: and this persists for up to 244, even though the outage was only 10 minutes
> 
> alecm: net result: large chunks of the world (anyone with an old descriptor + anyone randomly choosing F-J) have a shitty experience, which is not what high-availability is all about :-)
> 
> dgoulet: that will be what's going to happen - having a TTL in the desc. would help here indeed, I see the issue
> 
> dgoulet: TTL would be one thing to add, here we could also add a mechanism for a client retrying IPs that failed in the situation where some of the IPs are still working, or making client balance themself randomly could be also an idea
> 
> dgoulet: definitely there is some content here for tor-dev - I don't have a good answer but it should definitely be addressed
> 
> alecm: proper random selection of IP would be beneficial for load-balancing; not perfect, but in the long run, helpful

Hi Alec,

Most of what you said sounds right, and I agree that caching needs TTLs (not just here, all caches need to have them, always).

However, you mention that one DC going down could cause a bad experience for users. In most HA/DR setups I've seen there should be enough capacity if something fails, is that not the case for you? Can a single data center not serve all Tor traffic?

If that is a problem, I would suggest adding more data centers to the pool. That way if one fails, you don't lose half of the capacity, but a third (if N=3) or even a tenth (if N=10). 

Anyway, such a thing is probably off-topic. To get back to the point about TTLs, I just want to note that retrying failed nodes until all fail is scary: what will happen if all ten nodes get a 'rolling restart' throughout the day? Wouldn't you eventually end up with all the traffic on a single node, as it's the only one that hadn't been restarted yet?

As far as I can see the only thing that can avoid holes like that is a TTL, either hard coded to something like an hour, or just specified in the descriptor. Then, if you do a rolling restart, make sure you don't do it all within one TTL length, but at least two or three depending on capacity. 

Tom



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