[tor-dev] Effect of padding on end to end correlation false positive rate
grarpamp at gmail.com
Tue Oct 20 20:58:49 UTC 2015
On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 3:22 PM, s7r <s7r at sky-ip.org> wrote:
> I am describing something like a Sybil attack where the adversary runs
> relays, gets lucky and is selected in a certain position of a certain
> Does this change with padding? If yes, how?
> : https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows
My thought was solely restricted to analysis of network
traffic by *passive* adversary... not involving any collusion
by actives over circuits they can see inside or pump within
any given onion layer, though clocked and checked network
fill by all proper nodes would inhibit pumping by actives.
I talked on list with someone at briarproject and wherever
else on idea of filling the network with traffic vs the passives.
Apologize for not making time to review Mike's proposal
or develop further talk yet. Someone will review / integrate
fill padding of network with regard anonbib, Mike's, etc I'm sure,
as it is clearly (to me at least) a weakness of non-filled
non-store-and-forward networks vs the passives which we
all know and love.
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