[tor-dev] Graphs - Estimated Traffic Capacity

David Goulet dgoulet at ev0ke.net
Sat Nov 21 15:55:41 UTC 2015

On 21 Nov (16:26:31), Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> > On 21 Nov 2015, at 05:38, David Goulet <dgoulet at ev0ke.net> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > I know that we have sometimes 1, 4, 5, 6 or 7 hops circuit but the general case
> > is considered here and we have no stats on how frequent those unusual circuits
> > are.
> When I tested hidden service path lengths:
> Most clients cannibalized a 3-hop path for their directory, introduction point, and rendezvous circuits. So 4-hop paths may be quite frequent on the client side of hidden services.
> On the server side, it depends on how busy the hidden service is - whether it has any preemptively built paths to cannibalize or not.
> If so, it's side is typically 4 hops, if not, it is 3.

Indeed, I bet cannibalization happens more often then we think thus ending up
with a 4 hops circuit to either your IP or RP.

> It would be great to have some stats for typical path lengths, is there an open ticket for this, or should I create one?

That would help us have a better estimate of network capacity for sure but I
wonder if it worth the efforts versus having a real privacy oriented
statistics gathering system that could give us a much more accurate number of
the used and unused capacity of relays.

In other words, question comes down to should we put effort in a bigger larger
system or continue cherry-picking small stats here and there? (huge work once
vs small/medium-ish effort multiple time :)


> Tim
> Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
> teor2345 at gmail dot com
> PGP 968F094B
> teor at blah dot im
> OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

> _______________________________________________
> tor-dev mailing list
> tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 603 bytes
Desc: Digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20151121/af7cc0c8/attachment.sig>

More information about the tor-dev mailing list