[tor-dev] DoS resistance for Next-Generation Onion Services

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 20 Nov 2015, at 12:21, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> ...
> 
> A full list of changes is:
> ...
> * randomise revision-counter to avoid information leaks
> …


I just pushed a fixup to this commit: the revision-counter requires a minimum increment of 1 (not 0).

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20151120/38603d27/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 842 bytes
Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20151120/38603d27/attachment.sig>