[tor-dev] prop224: "revision-counter" field leaks service/intro point stability

Tim Wilson-Brown - teor teor2345 at gmail.com
Wed Nov 18 00:49:05 UTC 2015

Hi all,

The hidden service descriptor's "revision-counter" field is incremented every time the descriptor is updated.

I wonder what the distribution of these versions will be:
* a hidden service with a value of 0 (or 1) has just started up (or just rolled over to a new period)
* an unstable hidden service might have an unusually high count
* if enough introduction points go down or are DoSed, the hidden service will find new ones, and increment the count

Should we randomise the start value and increment?
How can we do this in a way that doesn't lead to exhaustion of the revision-counter?


Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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