[tor-dev] Update of prop#250: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

Tim Wilson-Brown - teor teor2345 at gmail.com
Mon Nov 2 06:30:16 UTC 2015

> On 31 Oct 2015, at 01:07, George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net> wrote:
> Jesse V <kernelcorn at riseup.net> writes:
>> David,
>> I'm in the midst of reworking my OnioNS design around prop250 (and the security
>> analysis therein) and as far as I can tell these changes make sense. I like the
>> 00:00 -> 24:00 change as it's more intuitive as you said. I was at first very
>> concerned that you removed the majority requirement as that is the assumption
>> made during consensus generation, but I think your argument for the new conflict
>> resolution make sense. I'm excited that the implementation is nearly complete
>> and I look forward to seeing it in Tor infrastructure!
> Hello Jesse,
> thanks for the feedback. Any opinions on whether we should keep the conflict
> lines or forget about them, based on David's email and my email?
> I just estimated that removing the conflict feature will kill about 400 lines of
> code, which is always nice :)

I'm in favour of moving the conflict feature to DocTor or something similar.

Any adversary who can break shared randomness is likely to also be able to break the entire consensus.
And the consensus is a high-value target, whereas shared randomness isn't (yet).

Therefore, I think we could treat any conflicts as bugs or misconfigurations, report them via IRC and a mailing list, and then deal with them on that basis.


Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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