[tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

Leif Ryge leif at synthesize.us
Mon May 4 13:10:31 UTC 2015

On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote:
> a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
> compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]

So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from being able to learn the client
computer's location, right? An attacker who has compromised some client
software just needs to control a single relay in the consensus, and they'll be
allowed to connect to it directly?

It is unclear to me what exactly this kind of tor router *is* supposed to
protect against. (I haven't read the whole document yet but I read a few
sections including Threat Model and I'm confused.)


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