[tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

[teor]

> Date: Sun, 3 May 2015 16:23:08 -0700
> From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com>
> 
>> I suggest also adding mandatory audit logging to the scope of the
>> router software. In my opinion any and all state changes, whether
>> automatic (Tor circuit change) or manual (administrator changing
>> configuration) must be logged.
> 
> this is an important detail; thank you for bringing it up. i will add
> the expected run logging and troubleshooting logging output collected
> on device and available to the owner via privacy director
> administrative access.

Some users will want as little logging as possible, as it can lead to privacy leaks if the device is compromised - may I suggest you turn it off by default?

teor

teor2345 at gmail dot com
pgp 0xABFED1AC
https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5

teor at blah dot im
OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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