[tor-dev] Proposal: Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points

Nicholas Hopper hopper at cs.umn.edu
Thu Jul 16 01:50:06 UTC 2015

On Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 4:48 PM, John Brooks
<john.brooks at dereferenced.net> wrote:
> Comments are encouraged, especially if there are downsides or side effects
> that we haven’t written about yet, or that you have a different opinion on.
> The intent is that we can decide to do this before implementing proposal
> 224, so they can be implemented together.

So an IP can do some things attack-wise that an HSDir cannot:
- Availability monitoring (useful for intersection or confirmation)
- Some side-channel linking attacks like latency and relay-clogging
- ... other things? I feel like there could be more...

This proposal doubles the default number of IPs and reduces the "cost"
of being an IP since the probability of being selected is no longer
bandwidth-weighted.  Is this a fair tradeoff for the performance

Nicholas Hopper
Associate Professor, Computer Science & Engineering
University of Minnesota

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