[tor-dev] Bi-directional families in Onionoo and consensus weight as measure of relayed bandwidth
karsten at torproject.org
Thu Jul 2 08:12:58 UTC 2015
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Moving this discussion here from another list with Virgil's permission.
On 02/07/15 08:42, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Big issues right now are: * Bugs (?) in Onionoo --- Onionoo doesn't
> sanitize its data. For example, there's a lack of bidirectionality
> between relays of many families.
> There are currently about 665 pairs of family relays without
> bidirectionality. This is caused by the .torrc of some relays not
> pointing to its family members.
> I am considering doing a service on top of Onionoo that sanitizes
> the raw Tor consensus to ensure things like bidirectional families.
> It's unclear how much other data needs sanitization.
I'd rather want to fix/change Onionoo than have you write another
service that processes Tor descriptors. There's even a ticket for
this, we're just somewhat stuck by arguing about the best fix. Maybe
I should just fix it somehow and, if necessary, fix it more later.
Would that solve your problem?
What other problems would there be with Onionoo's data? Can you make
a wish list?
> * A semi-reliable measure for the magnitude of traffic a relay has
> routed. We have confirmed instances of relays forging their
> observed bandwidth, ergo we can't use that. And thus far
> Consensus Weight is the best we've found, but it's unclear whether
> we can use that as a proxy of magnitude of relayed traffic. ---
> Right now the lack of a reliable measure of how much bandwidth is
> relayed is the largest sticking point.
Actually, consensus weight (fraction) is a fine measure, and I like
how you're calling it "bandwidth points" in your prototype which
doesn't imply a bits per second or related unit. I'd say assign
10,000 bandwidth points to all relays per day, depending on what
fraction of total consensus weight a relay had. To me, it's fine that
this doesn't translate to bits or bytes.
How does that sound?
All the best,
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