[tor-dev] Website Fingerprinting Defense via Traffic Splitting
daniel.forster at rwth-aachen.de
Wed Jan 7 19:16:19 UTC 2015
it would be great if I could get a few opinions regarding my upcoming
master thesis topic.
My supervisor is Andriy Panchenko (you may know some of his work from
Mike Perry's critique on website fingerprinting attacks).
As a defense, we'd like to experiment with traffic splitting (like
conflux- split traffic over multiple entry guards, but already merging
at the middle relay) and padding.
I know that the no. of entry guards got decreased from three to one.
May it be worth the research or is the approach heading in a not so
great direction w.r.t. the Tor Project's "only one entry node" decision?
Or, actually, what do you think in general..?
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