[tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
nickm at alum.mit.edu
Mon Dec 28 22:41:13 UTC 2015
On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 5:34 PM, Zhenfei Zhang
<zzhang at securityinnovation.com> wrote:
> Hi list,
> This is a proposal to use quantum-safe hybrid handshake for Tor
> Given NSA's recent announcement on moving towards quantum-safe cryptography,
> it would be nice to have a quantum-safe feature for Tor.
> The idea of the quantum-safe hybrid handshake is to combine both classical
> exchange and a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) instantiated by a quantum
> safe encryption algorithm, so that the combination gives both (classical)
> authentication and quantum safety. In a bit more details, the client and the
> agrees on a classic pre-master secret, $c$, using the ntor protocol. In
> parallel, client
> generates a public/private key pair of the quantum-safe encryption
> algorithm, and
> send the public key to the server. The server picks a random string, $q$,
> it with the public key and send the ciphertext back to the client. The final
> is the output of KDF(c|q).
> This proposal defeats the harvest-then-decrypt attack with a minimum impact
> the existing ntor protocol. An adversary needs to be able to break the
> encryption algorithm to learn q. On the other hand, if the quantum-safe
> algorithm turns out to be not secure, the protocol is still as secure as
> ntor protocol.
> In other words, it will at least do no harm to the current security.
> In addition, this is a modular design that allows us to use any quantum-safe
> cryptographic primitives. As a proof of concept, we instantiated the
> protocol with
> NTRUEncrypt lattice-based crypto. We implemented the the protocol with NTRU
> parameters that gives 128 bits security. The code is available at
> Please find the attachment for the request to change the feature. The proof
> of the
> protocol can be found at: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/287.pdf
> Some known issue:
> 1. cell size. As far as we know, all quantum-safe encryption algorithms have
> large key and/or ciphertext size that exceeds the cell size ~500. So this
> needs to transmit multiple cells, no matter which quantum-safe encryption
> algorithm we chose. This is addressed by "Proposal 249: Allow CREATE cells
> with >505 bytes of handshake data".
> 2. quantum-safe authentication: there is no quantum-safe authentication in
> protocol. We believe that authentication can wait, as future (quantum)
> cannot come back to present time and break authentication. Hence, we use
> authentication to keep the proposal compact and simple. It will be a future
> after this proposal.
> Thanks for your time, and happy holidays!
Thank you! This is now proposal 263.
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