[tor-dev] "Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation"
yawning at schwanenlied.me
Sat Aug 22 07:43:59 UTC 2015
On Fri, 21 Aug 2015 17:51:20 -0700
Kevin P Dyer <kpdyer at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 19, 2015 at 11:58 AM, Yawning Angel
> <yawning at schwanenlied.me> wrote:
> > [snip]
> > The FTE semantic attack they presented isn't the easiest one I know
> > of (the GET request as defined by the regex is pathologically
> > malformed).
> Very interesting! This is news to me. I'm assuming I did something
> silly. (Even though I tested it against bro, wireshark, etc.)
Huh. I brought it up in conversation with a few people and was under
the impression it was passed on. I probably should have e-mailed you
about it or something.
> How is it pathologically malformed?
"regex": "^GET\\ \\/([a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\/]*) HTTP/1\\.1\\r\\n\\r\\n$"
No "Host" header. All complaint requests MUST include one per RFC
2616, and all compliant servers MUST respond with a 400 if it is
Since requests of that sort should invoke the error path on RFC
compliant servers it's a really good distinguisher since legitimate
clients will not do such a thing. Existing realistic adversaries
already have "identify 'suspicious behavior', call back to confirm"
style filtering in production, so false positive rate can be reduce to
0 if needed.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
More information about the tor-dev