[tor-dev] [RFC] On new guard algorithms and data structures
paul.syverson at nrl.navy.mil
Fri Aug 21 13:32:07 UTC 2015
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 08:09:13AM -0400, l.m wrote:
> I'm curious what analysis has been done against a gateway adversary.
> In particular dealing with the effectiveness of entry guards against
> such an adversary. There's a part of me that thinks it doesn't work at
> all for this case. Only because I've been studying such an adversary
> at the AS-level and what I see over time is disturbing. Any pointer to
> related material?
You may find the following useful.
Analysis there is a now few years old, but this is the first attempt
to try to fully consider the sort of question I think you are
asking. This was one of the prompts for the move from three guards to
one, as described in
There is subsequent related published work on measurement and analysis
of AS and similar adversaries, e.g.,
Also subsequent work on managing assignment of guards in a practical and
secure manner (although this paper pretty much assumes only relay adversaries).
This also remains an active area, both for analysis and for AS-aware
route selection. (I haven't put in any pointers to papers on the latter.)
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