[tor-dev] [RFC] On new guard algorithms and data structures

[Paul Syverson]

Hi Leeroy,

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 08:09:13AM -0400, l.m wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I'm curious what analysis has been done against a gateway adversary.
> In particular dealing with the effectiveness of entry guards against
> such an adversary. There's a part of me that thinks it doesn't work at
> all for this case. Only because I've been studying such an adversary
> at the AS-level and what I see over time is disturbing. Any pointer to
> related material?
> 

You may find the following useful. 
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-correlation-tor-realistic-adversaries

Analysis there is a now few years old, but this is the first attempt
to try to fully consider the sort of question I think you are
asking. This was one of the prompts for the move from three guards to
one, as described in
https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Dingledine.pdf

There is subsequent related published work on measurement and analysis
of AS and similar adversaries, e.g.,
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2015.issue-2/popets-2015-0021/popets-2015-0021.xml?format=INT

Also subsequent work on managing assignment of guards in a practical and
secure manner (although this paper pretty much assumes only relay adversaries).
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2015.issue-2/popets-2015-0017/popets-2015-0017.xml?format=INT

This also remains an active area, both for analysis and for AS-aware
route selection. (I haven't put in any pointers to papers on the latter.)

HTH,
Paul