[tor-dev] Hash Visualizations to Protect Against Onion Phishing

Georg Koppen gk at torproject.org
Fri Aug 21 10:36:47 UTC 2015

Yawning Angel:
> As much as all of these are important issues, if we search for a
> solution that works for absolutely everyone, then we will never
> implement anything, because IMO no such thing exists.
> I sort of have mixed feelings about this in general, but since enough
> people seem to think it's a good idea, what appears to be the obvious
> way forward is:
>  * Come up with a well defined interface for "take an opaque blob,
>    present it to the user".
>  * Implement the underlying firefox glue.
>  * Test deploy a few user select-able representation modules.
> Without doing so, trying to hash out any sorts of design(s) will likely
> end badly, and going with "write the framework that lets us do UX
> testing" will let us get a better handle on the problem[0].

I agree with all the points Yawning is making here (inclusive the mixed
feelings). One thing to add would be that this fits perfectly the
purpose of the Tor Browser alpha series which is meant to provide a
testbed especially for features that are hard to get right right from
the beginning.


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