[tor-dev] [RFC] On new guard algorithms and data structures
s7r at sky-ip.org
Thu Aug 20 14:07:35 UTC 2015
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Thanks for the input!
On 8/20/2015 4:59 PM, l.m wrote:
>> "b) ..."
> Retrying guards is the crux of the problem. If you blindly retry
> guards, even to prevent rotation, you eventually come to a hard
> place where this will backfire badly. Even if it works sometimes.
> Although I don't think the client should rely on the OS (which may
> be compromised).
I agree, that is why I said reasonable amount of retries at reasonable
time intervals. Not blindly retrying but also not rotating guards
every time an user walks out of the signal coverage area of a wi-fi
Can you suggest a retry amount and time interval? I think 10 times
once every 20 minutes for the Guards we selected but never connected
to and double or even triple that for the Guards we remember we were
once able to connect to is reasonable. After we successfully connect
to a Guard (again or for the first time) we reset the timestamp and
retry attempts counter.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32)
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
More information about the tor-dev