[tor-dev] [RFC] On new guard algorithms and data structures
ter.one.leeboi at hush.com
Thu Aug 20 12:25:33 UTC 2015
> "To improve our algorithm and make it more robust we need to
understand further what kind of path bias attacks are relevant
here...What nasty attacks can this adversary do?"
An gateway adversary which can filter the network can use guards to
fingerprint you. This requires connecting to tor directly through the
By watching which guards are attempted from a preexisting list of
guard. If these guards are then filtered, and the client changes
location, then reconnects, the client will be identifiable by the
(filtered) guards it attempts to use. It's not a mitigation to only
use one guard here.
> "If we can't find bad attacks here, then maybe we should stop
worrying about those path bias attacks so much."
Some types of attack are unavoidable. Detecting unobfuscated tor use
in the case for including at least one 80/443 guard. The only concern
I have is trying no more than 80 relay at a time still leaves a lot of
room for fingerprinting (if those relay persist between bootstraps).
This also raises the question of false positive and proving a gateway
adversary is the source of interference. A simplification might be to
have the client fail faster (than 80) and be forced to try bridges.
> "...a threat here with the old guard logic, is that if we used this
evil gateway just for 10 minutes (in an airport), the adversary could
launch a path bias attack and force us to connect to her guard node."
A mitigation for the airport analogy posed might be to base network
location on routing characteristics. I know portable NLA is hard. If
the location-characteristic route changes in some way (like change
from airport to coffee shop), then consider location as having changed
and also consider dropping airport guard.
> "Also, an adversary that manages to own our guard using path bias
attacks, then has further possibilities for biasing the rest of the
circuit. What can this
With modified tor software, and having already compromised the
gateway, an adversary can, over-time, game the entire path selection.
The adversary has at least 10 minutes in which a tor client will
prefer certain nodes for types of traffic. After compromising the
guard, the adversary gateway, then direct their attention to the rest
of the path. They need to avoid failing too much or another guard gets
chosen. So fail the occasional node selection, and end up rebiasing
the chance of selecting a bad relay/exit in the favor of the
adversary. How much failure is required? Doesn't that depend on the
parameters maintained by a tor client?
> "Also, I was not sure what CONNECTED_THRESHOLD was useful for, and
there were certain engineering issues with it (Like, if that threshold
is hit, we need a
logic that will *only retry the successfully connected guards*, and
not all guards).
If you try *all* guards you make the fingerprinting mentioned above
easier. Although even if you try successfully connected guards you run
into this problem.
> "There is no log message warning the user of path bias attacks or
bad network or anything. That's because there is no way to figure out
what's the problem,
and issuing an alarming log message here would confuse and panic the
Maybe this could be simplified to a log entry to indicate guard
rotation, or a guard which was previously up is now unlisted or down.
Couldn't the old guard be tested by using the first non-failing
circuit that follows? If it's connectable using this circuit you can
say something is amiss.
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