[tor-dev] Proposal: Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points

Michael Rogers michael at briarproject.org
Wed Aug 19 22:01:39 UTC 2015

On 12/07/15 22:48, John Brooks wrote:
> 1.3. Other effects on proposal 224
>    An adversarial introduction point is not significantly more capable than a
>    hidden service directory under proposal 224. The differences are:
>      1. The introduction point maintains a long-lived circuit with the service
>      2. The introduction point can break that circuit and cause the service to
>         rebuild it

Regarding this second difference: the introduction point (cooperating
with a corrupt middle node) could potentially try to discover the
service's guard by repeatedly breaking the circuit until it was rebuilt
through the corrupt middle node. Would it make sense to use vanguards
here, as well as on rendezvous circuits?

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