[tor-dev] Future Onion Addresses and Human Factors

Jeff Burdges burdges at gnunet.org
Sun Aug 9 10:20:36 UTC 2015

On Sun, 2015-08-09 at 07:26 +0000, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> > Isn't the 51% attack down to a 20ish% attack now?
> The estimate I did was based on Namecoin hashrate, not Bitcoin
> hashrate.  I assume that's the distinction you're referring to, though
> you're not really making it clear.

No.  I haven't kept up to date on blockchain technologies as they never
looked particularly great to me, but..

There was a succession of research results that lowers the 51% attack on
btcoin into the 30s % range and eventually into the 20s % range.  

I donno if OnionNS is susceptible to these attacks, as it's threat model
is slightly different.

> I think you will find that a number of users are unlikely to
> exclusively use bookmarks and not use web links.  

There is no need for a domain on links within a single site.  It's true
that cross site links are common enough that fishing attacks can trick
users into typing their password into a facebookfakeblah.onion url.


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