[tor-dev] Draft of proposal "Direct Onion Services: Fast-but-not-hidden services"

Speak Freely when2plus2is5 at riseup.net
Mon Apr 20 13:32:18 UTC 2015

Following on Aaron's suggestion, and further pushing my own wee agenda,
what about PS? it works because even if someone confused the acronym for
something else, it still works. And it matches well with HS/OS.
- Public (Onion) Service
- Peeled (Onion) Service
- Pseudo (Onion) Service <-- I like this as well, for various reasons


- exposed onion service, in my mind, would lead to people thinking the
connection is in no way secure, because it is "exposed." It definitely
does have the antonym of "hidden" built in, though. Escaping the "dark
web" connotations is good, but this may lead to the wrong understanding
by a small but loud group of people. I can fully envision some special
people running around on blogs, mailing lists, etc, telling the whole
world to avoid "'exposed onion services' because the
NSA/CIA/GCHQ/CSIS/DARPA forced the Tor community to create a service
that EXPOSES YOU!!!!" and all that donkey manure.

- bare onion service, if following Aaron's suggestion of dropping the
onion, would lead to BS, which is not really an acronym anyone would
want to have. :)

I do like FS, but only if the performance improvements are quantifiably
larger. Obviously the whole point of this endeavour is to make the speed
and performance better, but until it is measured, I'm concerned "Fast
(Onion) Service" may somewhat misrepresent the actual outcome. For
example, hitting terribly slow "Fast Services", presumably because the
service is so well loved that thousands of people use it, would upset
some people not really understanding why it's slow.

With the above comment, that's why I like DS, because regardless of
quantifiably increased performance, it is clear that it is a direct
connection to the [Service], and there is no implied improvements beyond
the statement that it's direct.

Then there's also "Direct Public (Onion) Service", which would be DPS or

Speak Freely

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