[tor-dev] Scaling tor for a global population

isis isis at torproject.org
Mon Sep 29 23:12:04 UTC 2014

isis transcribed 14K bytes:
> [...]

Oopsie daisies. Forgot my footnotes and references! Voilá:

[0]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en
[1]: https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=dirbytes&start=2014-06-27&end=2014-09-25#dirbytes
[2]: https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2014-06-27&end=2014-09-25#bandwidth

[3]: Please, don't give all the shit relays to me as bridges. I think it's
     less important scalability-wise (right now) to have a strict cutoff rate
     for bridges, but eventually, when/if we ever have Bridge Bandwidth
     Authorities, BridgeDB should cut off anything below some completely
     arbitrary rate, like 100 KB/s. I've gotten a bridge (from
     http://bridges.torproject.org) which was 28 B/s. Yes, *bytes*. That thing
     was probably slowing down the rest of the Tor network just by *existing*
     via its molasses-speeds blocking the Exit from continuing the response
     after SENDME number of cells, which is probably eventually going to cause
     TCP timeouts on the Exit's side and a whole bunch of other messes.

 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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