[tor-dev] On the visualization of OONI bridge reachability data

Karsten Loesing karsten at torproject.org
Sat Oct 25 11:01:52 UTC 2014

On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:
> isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
>>    * The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
>>    * The hashed ip:port
> Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote this and totally
> completely wrong.
> A hashed ip:port would be a terrible idea because IPv4 space is only 2^32 and
> ports are 2^16. In total that's a 2^48 message space. Hashing for a preimage
> to get the bridge addresses in quite feasible in those constaints, as well as
> precomputing the attack offline.
> We should come up with a different way to hide ip:ports.

I'm lacking context, but just in case this is even remotely relevant,
here's how CollecTor sanitizes bridge IP addresses:


All the best,

More information about the tor-dev mailing list