[tor-dev] On the visualization of OONI bridge reachability data

isis isis at torproject.org
Thu Oct 23 23:53:35 UTC 2014

isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
>    * The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
>    * The hashed ip:port

Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote this and totally
completely wrong.

A hashed ip:port would be a terrible idea because IPv4 space is only 2^32 and
ports are 2^16. In total that's a 2^48 message space. Hashing for a preimage
to get the bridge addresses in quite feasible in those constaints, as well as
precomputing the attack offline.

We should come up with a different way to hide ip:ports.

 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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