[tor-dev] Defending against guard discovery attacks by pinning middle nodes
mikeperry at torproject.org
Wed Nov 12 22:47:31 UTC 2014
> > HS -> Guard_1 -> Guard_2 -> Guard_3 -> RP.
> > The idea is that Guard_1 is a single node that you choose and keep
> > for O(6 months, or as long as possible), but Guard_2 actually comes
> > from a set of 3-6 or so nodes that you keep for O(weeks), and
> > Guard_3 you rotate something like O(hours).
> > The hope behind my reasoning is that if it is incredibly likely for
> > you to rotate your guard(s) before they are discovered, guard
> > discovery attacks lose their value.
> This doesn’t make sense - do you mean "if it is likely for you to
> rotate your guards *after” they are discovered"?
Err, right, my argument for the different rotation periods hinges on
minimizing the time after discovery happens during which the adversary
gets to try to set up surveillance.
> > OTOH, perhaps I am reasoning about this wrong, and it is
> > operationally better to stick with a guard node in the second
> > position for as long as you stick with your first guard. In my mind,
> > having identical rotation periods is only better if you subscribe to
> > the theory that compromising a node is a noisy process, and unlikely
> > to succeed in repeated succession. In which case, you probably just
> > want a static route of exactly three (and only three) guard nodes,
> > fixed for the lifetime of your HS. At least, if you want the most
> > security in this threat model.
> > Does this make sense?
> I don’t follow your reasoning. Even if compromising is a completely
> deterministic process, it would be better to have one quickly rotating
> node at the end of the HS-side circuit because if each hop rotated
> slowly the adversary would have enough time upon discovery of each hop
> to set up surveillance of the next (where the last hop is always
> immediately discovered by the adversarially-chosen RP). Having a
> quickly-rotating final hop from the HS means the adversary has to wait
> until the HS rotates to an adversarially-controlled relay.
> > It sounds like you subscribe to the first "it's cumbersome to
> > compromise a node, so keep a fixed route" threat model and goal,
> > right? Would it make you more nervous if the exit was also fixed? If
> > so, why? If not, why not?
> As I was saying above, a fixed exit would allow compromise in the time
> it takes to begin surveillance (times three). We can likely do better
> than that.
Ok, this was my assumption behind arguing for staggering these rotation
periods, too. I don't think that having a fixed exit is a good idea, and
this same conclusion has led me to believe that the rotation times
should be staggered. I am having a hard time understanding why two
layers of guards of the same rotation lifespan is necessarily better
than one, especially since the sybil attack to determine the second
guard from a fast rotating exit is likely to succeed within a few days.
However, I also see that if we're talking about those middle nodes
rotating on the order of a week, that might be a long time for an
adversary to play with to determine the first guard, even if we minimize
that expected time period between discovering it and rotation. I guess
it depends on what we expect that overlap to be, but it probably is
O(rotation_time/2) given that we're dealing with uniform disributions
over time here.
I willl try to find some time to play with your script to see if I can
fully convince myself that rotation doesn't help for the middle node
even under a coercive threat model.
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