[tor-dev] Hidden Service authorization UI

Andrea Shepard andrea at torproject.org
Mon Nov 10 07:42:33 UTC 2014

On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 09:16:40PM -0500, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> On 2014-11-09 15:30, Fabio Pietrosanti - lists wrote:
> >On 11/9/14 8:58 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> >>>For example, it would be interesting if TBB would allow people to
> >>>input a password/pubkey upon visiting a protected HS. Protected HSes
> >>>can be recognized by looking at the "authentication-required"
> >>>field of
> >>>the HS descriptor. Typing your password on the browser is much more
> >>>useable than editing a config file.
> >>That sounds interesting.
> >
> >Also i love this idea but i would suggest to preserve the copy&paste
> >self-authenticated URL property of TorHS, also in presence of
> >authorization.
>   I'm conflicted about this idea.  Much better for usability ~but~
> there should be an option for authenticated hidden services that
> want to *not* prompt and instead fail silently if the key isn't in
> the torrc (or x.y.onion url, depending on the design).
>   Use case: if someone finds my hidden service url written in my
> planner while traveling across the border, they might visit it to
> see what it contains. If it offers a prompt, then they know it
> exists and can press me for the auth key (perhaps with an M4
> carbine).  If there's no prompt and the request fails, then perhaps
> it "used to exist" a long time ago, or I wrote down an example URL.
> best,
> Griffin

I believe it's verifiable whether an authenticated HS exists anyway; you can
get the descriptor, but the list of intro points is encrypted.

Andrea Shepard
<andrea at torproject.org>
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