[tor-dev] I have a group at internet archive that are interested in buying a lot of OnionPi's

Lunar lunar at torproject.org
Sun Jun 29 18:46:45 UTC 2014

Martin Kepplinger:
> Am 2014-06-29 08:57, schrieb Roger Dingledine:
> > On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 10:11:24PM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> >> On 06/27/2014 09:44 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> >>> What is the current state of the art on this, and if it is ready for
> >>> larger deployment want to buy about 50-100 of them.
> >>
> >> In my eyes, an access point that has a captive portal that teaches
> >> people about Tor and facilitates the download of Tor Browser etc is much
> >> better than transparent proxying.
> > 
> > Right. Using a transparent torifying box as a client is dangerous,
> > because your Internet Explorer or other "normal" browser will probably
> > introduce surprising privacy problems compared to using Tor Browser.
> > Using your middlebox as a firewall to prevent non-Tor traffic from
> > transiting, i.e. to make sure you are using only Tor, is much safer but
> > also much less sexy.
> what would be an approach to build that? the accesspoint would need a
> list of current entry nodes, which is, all public relays, right?

(from the February 19th, 2014 of Tor Weekly News:)

Rusty Bird announced [16] the release of corridor [17], a Tor traffic
whitelisting gateway. corridor will turn a Linux system into a router
that “allows only connections to Tor relays to pass through (no clearnet
leaks!)”. However, unlike transparent proxying solutions, “client
computers are themselves responsible for torifying their own traffic.”

  [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032152.html
  [17]: https://github.com/rustybird/corridor

Lunar                                             <lunar at torproject.org>
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