[tor-dev] Hidden service policies

Moritz Bartl moritz at torservers.net
Mon Jul 21 10:09:57 UTC 2014

On 07/21/2014 12:34 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic
> they consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of
> international group consensus emerges about what is and is not
> acceptable usage of Tor. For instance, SMTP out is widely restricted.

As Andrea said, the exit policies are there mostly to have a small knob
to stop complaints.

In that sense, participation as a hidden service is "opt-in": You're
willing to lose the ability to use IP address as a rough method of
identifying users.

A network provider should in an ideal world _never_ [be able to]
interfere with any of the traffic they transport. I already feel very
uncomfortable limiting "arbitrary" destinations based on IP and port. A
network provider is a neutral channel. Remember, data payload is just
protocol overhead.

Moritz Bartl

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