[tor-dev] [tor-relays] Hidden service policies
grarpamp at gmail.com
Mon Jul 21 06:01:41 UTC 2014
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite at riseup.net> wrote:
> Mike Hearn,
> Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it
> is ... then I will
> block any connection of your relays to mine
> Freedom isn't free unless it is
> totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a
> bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and
> everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact
> somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose
> blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping.
> As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin
> tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify
> "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of
many discussions from that suggestion is here:
> so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I
> can avoid them.
router riker 126.96.36.199 9001 0 0
fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD
contact Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net>
Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure
of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy
of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking?
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