[tor-dev] Projects to combat/defeat data correlation

Griffin Boyce griffin at cryptolab.net
Thu Jan 16 20:33:01 UTC 2014

Ximin Luo wrote:
> In my understanding, the anonymity set doesn't apply to use of PTs 
> since this is only at the entry side. The exit side does not know[1] 
> what PT the originator is using, so is unable to use that information 
> to de-anonymise.
> [1] at least, in theory should not know, perhaps someone can check 
> there are no side-channels? would be pretty scary if exit could work 
> out that originator is using PTs.

   Anonymity is still a consideration, even if it's highly unlikely to 
be impinged upon by pluggable transports.  For example, if a network 
notices someone connect to a known obfsproxy bridge, then they can make 
an educated guess that the person is using both Tor and obfsproxy.  With 
flashproxy, this is of much less concern given address diversity.  With 
bananaphone, it wouldn't really apply at all as far as I can see.


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