[tor-dev] Guard node security: ways forward (An update from the dev meeting)
desnacked at riseup.net
Tue Feb 25 02:43:26 UTC 2014
Ian Goldberg <iang at cs.uwaterloo.ca> writes:
> On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 02:06:39AM +0000, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> And because release-early-release-often, here is a graph:
>> The middle boxplot is the probability distribution of our current
>> guard selection process (e.g. the most likely to be selected guard
>> node is selected with probability ~0.013). The right boxplot is the
>> probability distribution we would have if we pruned the guard nodes
>> that are slower than 4MB/s. We can see that in that case, the most
>> popular guard node has probability of ~0.15 being selected.
> You mean 0.015, right?
Yep. I meant ~0.015. :)
Although actually it's 0.0145066975568...
(I'm using a consensus a few days old "valid-after 2014-02-21 14:00:00".)
Unfortunately, compass.torproject.org is down at the moment and I
can't validate the results.
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