[tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 hops rendezvous circuit design
dave2008713 at gmail.com
Wed Feb 12 00:01:18 UTC 2014
On 02/11/2014 04:51 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:55:05AM -0500, Qingping Hou wrote:
>> (0) client fetches descriptor for a hidden service.
>> (1) client connects to introduction point.
>> (2) since client and HS are connected via introduction point, they can
>> negotiate a random number using this channel.
>> (For more details, see [RAND_NEGO])
>> (3) both client and HS maps that random number to a random onion router
>> using the same scheme, so they end up with the same node.
>> This is the candidate RP.
>> (4) both client and HS create a 3 hops circuit using RP as last hop.
>> (5) RP joins the circuit originates from HS to the circuit originates
>> from client.
>> (6) now client and HS are connected. Because their original circuits
>> share the same endpoint(the RP), the length of the path is 5 hops.
> Worth discussing.
>> to the whole process. Firstly, it reuses the connection to introduction
>> point for both sides so it requires no extra circuits build up.
>> Secondly, the bottle neck is circuit setup, cell/stream transmission
>> delay is actually pretty low.
> To be clear, the client is the one who learns first what the RP should
> be, yes? That means:
> A) The problem George brought up -- the client can keep doing this dance
> until they agree upon an RP that the client controls, and now the HS
> effectively has a two-hop path to the RP. Maybe that is ok (two is still
> more than one), but it should be made clear.
> B) The client should extend a circuit to RP first, establish a rendezvous
> cookie there, and only then respond to HS with its R_a and rend cookie?
> Otherwise there will be a race where both sides try to extend to RP, and
> it's unspecified what happens if HS gets there first.
No, to make it faster, it should return R_a immediately. This is a symmetric
design, so both sides send the rendezvous cookie along the circuit. RP will
join the two circuits once it received the same rendezvous cookies.
>> Note that at step 2), if HS is able to recover R_a from H(R_a), it can take
>> control over R_c. So to mitigate this, we can use a variant of
>> Diffie-Hellman handshake:
>> (1) client generates a public key g^x and sends the digest H(g^x) to HS
>> (2) HS remembers H(g^x), generates a public key g^y and sends it back
>> to the client
>> (3) client receives g^y and sends back g^x to HS
>> (4) HS checks g^x against H(g^x) to make sure it's not generated after
>> client receives g^y.
>> (5) Now both client and HS compute a shared random number: R_c = g^(xy)
> You're making both sides do public key operations just because the hash
> function might be broken? I would guess the load, and DoS opportunities,
> introduced by public key operations on the HS side will outweigh any
> theoretical benefits here.
Agree. will a large random number be sufficient here? We are working on the
prototype ATM. Maybe we can measure this a bit after it's done :)
>> This is where hop negotiation come into play. A negotiated hop is
>> guaranteed to be a random node and cannot be determined by anyone.
> For a single run this is true, but for the repeated game it's not. This
> might be the killer flaw here.
Right, as we noted at the beginning, this proposal focuses on speeding up HS
while not introducing new vulns. Current HSv3 has this problem as well. As I
replied in George's mail, the attacker can keep sending introduce cell to HS
and thus forcing it to create new circuits, i.e. re-pick the last hop.
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