[tor-dev] high latency hidden services
michael at briarproject.org
Tue Dec 9 21:40:32 UTC 2014
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On 25/11/14 12:45, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Yes, integrating low-latency with high-latency anonymity is a very
> interesting probleml. Unfortunately, I haven't had any time to
> think about it.
> For people who want to think about it there is the "Blending
> different latency traffic with alpha-mixing" paper. Roger mentioned
> that one of the big challenges of making the paper usable with Tor,
> is switching from the message-based approach to stream-based.
> Other potential papers are "Stop-and-Go-MIX" by Kesdogan et al.
> and "Garbled Routing (GR): A generic framework towards unification
> of anonymous communication systems" by Madani et al. But I haven't
> looked into them at all...
Two of these papers were also mentioned in the guardian-dev thread, so
I guess we're thinking along similar lines.
Alpha mixes and stop-and-go mixes are message-oriented, which as you
said raises the question of how to integrate them into Tor. Judging by
the abstract of the garbled routing paper (paywalled), it's a hybrid
design combining message-oriented and circuit-oriented features. I
think there might also be scope for circuit-oriented designs with
higher latency than Tor currently provides, which might fit more
easily into the Tor architecture than message-oriented or hybrid designs.
A circuit-oriented design would aim to prevent an observer from
matching the circuits entering a relay with the circuits leaving the
relay. In other words it would prevent traffic confirmation at each
hop, and thus also end-to-end.
At least four characteristics can be used to match circuits entering
and leaving a relay: start time, end time, total traffic volume and
traffic timing. The design would need to provide ways to mix a circuit
with other circuits with respect to each characteristic.
The current architecture allows start and end times to be mixed by
pausing at each hop while building or tearing down a circuit. However,
each hop of a given circuit must start earlier and end later than the
Traffic volumes can also be mixed by discarding padding at each hop,
but each hop must carry at least as much traffic as the next hop (or
vice versa for traffic travelling back towards the initiator). This is
analogous to the problem of messages shrinking at each hop of a
cypherpunk mix network, as padding is removed but not added.
There's currently no way to conceal traffic timing - each relay
forwards cells as soon as it can.
Here's a crude sketch of a design that allows all four characteristics
to be mixed, with fewer constraints than the current architecture.
Each hop of a circuit must start earlier than the next hop, but it can
end earlier or later, carry more or less traffic, and have different
The basic idea is that the initiator chooses a traffic pattern for
each direction of each hop. The traffic pattern is described by a
distribution of inter-cell delays. Each relay sends the specified
traffic pattern regardless of whether it has any data to send, and
regardless of what happens at other hops.
Whenever a relay forwards a data cell along a circuit, it picks a
delay from the specified distribution, adds it to the current time,
and writes the result on the circuit's queue. When the scheduler
round-robins over circuits, it skips any circuits with future times
written on them. If a circuit's time has come, the relay sends the
first queued data cell if there is one; if not, it sends a single-hop
Flow control works end-to-end in the same way as any other Tor
circuit: single-hop padding cells aren't included in the circuit's
flow control window.
When tearing down the circuit, the initiator tells each relay how long
to continue sending the specified traffic pattern in each direction.
Thus each hop may stop sending traffic before or after the next hop.
Even this crude design has multiple parameters, so its anonymity
properties may not be easy to reason about. Even if we restrict
traffic patterns to a single-parameter distribution such as the
exponential, we also have to consider the pause time at each hop while
building circuits and the 'hangover time' at each hop while tearing
them down. But I think we can mine the mix literature for some ideas
to apply - and probably some attacks against this first attempt at a
design as well.
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