[tor-dev] obfsproxy buffering
dstainton415 at gmail.com
Mon Nov 18 16:39:30 UTC 2013
>> It seems like the solution is to write a super simple "framing
>> protocol"... which is to say that I can first send a frame length; and
>> on the receiving end simply read until frame length worth of data is
>> consumed... and then apply the crypto_stream cipher on that frame with
>> the correct corresponding nonce.
> That sounds like a reasonable solution. ScrambleSuit also has its own protocol
> header, if that helps:
Cool. Thanks! I'll take a look.
> Also, I'm probably stating the obvious here, but you seem to be using a static
> key for encryption and decryption. That results in a many time pad, i.e., the
> same key is used for many plain texts. That's a problem because Tor's TLS
> handshake is predictable and a censor could observe that multiple independent
> SaltyStream connections share several bytes in their handshake. You might want
> to use a key derivation function, as also suggested by the NaCl doc:
>> NaCl does not make any promises regarding the resistance of crypto_stream to
>> "related-key attacks." It is the caller's responsibility to use proper
>> key-derivation functions.
I wrote this as a sort of rough draft... It is meant to accept a key
from the commandline... you know, for testing.
So I specified default keys... but really this is just for testing. To
be useful at all there'd have to be
proper key generation like you are saying and key exchange...
It's OK to use crypto_stream to encode multiple messages with the same key
as long as the nonce is different each time :
"""This means that an attacker cannot distinguish this function from a
uniform random function. Consequently, if a series of messages is
encrypted by crypto_stream_xor with a different nonce for each
message, the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from uniform random
strings of the same length."""
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