[tor-dev] "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization"

Tom Ritter tom at ritter.vg
Tue May 28 20:56:18 UTC 2013

On 28 May 2013 16:33, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org> wrote:
> Additionally, as far as I can see, if you can control the introduction
> points using the attack from the first part of the paper, you could also
> perform this attack against a *user* as well (which is the threat model
> strongbox really tries to address). A captured Introduction Point could
> repeatedly fail circuits, forcing the user to reconnect on new ones
> until their Guard node is discovered.
> Of course, most users will probably give up trying to use the service
> long before the hour is up, but if the attack could be optimized in any
> other way, it could mean trouble..

They won't give up if they are irssi trying to reconnect to a server.
Or a VPN trying to auto-reconnect. Or any manner of non-human
auto-retrying applications talking to a Hidden Service.


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