[tor-dev] Building better pluggable transports (Google Summer of Code)

Tom Ritter tom at ritter.vg
Tue May 28 19:04:53 UTC 2013

On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos <adrelanos at riseup.net> wrote:

> How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside?
> Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide
> communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed
> with a fairly good results.
> Tor isn't a website, but if SSH leaks which website has been visited
> even when using a SSH tunnel, will it also leak the fact, that someone
> is using Tor through a SSH tunnel?

I think that if we make the adversary upgrade from probing and byte
matching (e.g. look for specific ciphersuites) to statistical protocol
modeling, especially with a small time investment on our part, we have won
a battle.  Development effort isn't free.

You probably can detect Tor traffic inside of SSH with some probability X
after some amount of traffic Y.  But what X, what Y, and how much effort on
behalf of the adversary will it take?  I don't know, but I do think we
should work to move the fight beyond something as simple as byte matching.

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