[tor-dev] Iran

Andrea Shepard andrea at torproject.org
Tue May 7 11:38:26 UTC 2013

On Sun, May 05, 2013 at 10:40:52AM +0000, Nima wrote:
> Iran is actively dropping connections to *any* unknown port right after
> *60secs*.
> Pluggable Transport successfully connects to Tor network, Although it
> can not make a circuit in many ISPs including "Mobin".
> -- 
> Nima
> 0x1C92A77B
> "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right
> to say it" --Evelyn Beatrice Hall

Hmmm... what does it behave like during those 60 seconds?  Is it throttled,
or can we get data through by cycling through a series of fresh TCP

What does it do with UDP packets?  Could a datagram-based protocol defeat
this?  If they're interfering there, what about using TCP-looking packets to
fake it?  I.e., send SYNs with the data we really want to get through in the
body and let them waste resources on their routers tracking connections
that don't even really exist.

Andrea Shepard
<andrea at torproject.org>
PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5  DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5
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