[tor-dev] Memorable onion addresses (was Discussion on the crypto migration plan of the identity keys of Hidden Services)
grarpamp at gmail.com
Fri Jun 7 06:23:55 UTC 2013
>> This has the side effect of promoting good onion upkeep.
Which people might be loathe to do given the recent paper
about deanon hidden services seeming to be relatively doable.
At least until those issues are solved...
> of the system. After 6 months (or so) the naming will stabilize and be
> (mostly) consistent month-to-month, but how do we guarantee that a
...not if people are replacing their network address every month.
> I know very little about eepsites, but as long as the guarantees
> provided by eepsites and HS are equivalent regarding security and
> anonymity, this is an interesting idea. The easiest/obvious way to
> accomplish this is to have gateways/peering-points between the two
> Unless, are you talking about running I2P and Tor on the same
> computer/network and being able use the same naming scheme to connect to
> both eepSites and Hidden Services?
One such obvious scheme that exists today is your host simply
routing packets out its tunnel interfaces resident on respective
Tor / I2P / Phantom IPv6 address space to some such services.
Then anything, or set of things with unique addressing amongst
them, can have some petname layer on top.
> malicious actor is not able to register popular internet domains
> (torproject, ddg, etc) before the legitimate/honest actor?
Really? Lol. You're not going to solve that even if you recreate
the non-anonymous internet. Petname strings in an anonymous
censor free system have no gatekeepers. As with the internet,
users will set up, choose, and duke it out in their own DNS for that
if they want it... on top of the provided secure network addressing.
Even being able to put/maintain *any* name out there will be hard.
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