[tor-dev] Proposal 207: Directory guards
nickm at alum.mit.edu
Mon Oct 15 17:49:24 UTC 2012
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 10:53 PM, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org> wrote:
> Thus spake Nick Mathewson (nickm at alum.mit.edu):
>> On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 3:17 PM, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org> wrote:
>> > Thus spake Nick Mathewson (nickm at torproject.org):
>> >> Discussion:
>> >> The rule that the set of guards and the set of directory guards need to
>> >> be disjoint, and the rule that multiple directory guards need to be
>> >> providing descriptors, are both attempts to make it harder for a
>> >> single node to capture a route.
>> > Can you explain the route capture opportunities available to directory
>> > guards? Is it #5343/#5956?
>> Like that general class, yes. It worries me to have too few sources
>> of directory info; with bridges we have no choice, but with directory
>> guards, we can make sure that we have multiple sources.
>> In particular, it's a little obnoxious for the same party to be both
>> the first hop of your circuit, *and* to know exactly what you know
>> about possible candidates for hop 2 and hop 3.
> Ok, so it sounds like this is more the second rule than the first rule?
I think it's both, perhaps. If only one source is providing you with
directory info, you're in trouble either way. But if that source is
also your first hop, it is farther along in its attempts to manipulate
you than it would be otherwise, and has an easier time taking
advantage of them. It can also take advantage of knowledge a little
In particular, if I'm your guard, and you ask me for descriptors some
nodes including node X, and you then immediately build a circuit
through me before I tell you node X, I know you didn't know know node
X when you built that circuit. Contrast that with the case where I'm
only a guard -- I don't know what you're downloading. And contrast
that with the case where I'm only a directory -- I don't know when,
exactly, you're building circuits.
Even if you *do* have multiple working guards, the issue still exists.
Once I see that you're building circuits for traffic, I know that any
descriptor I give you *after* that point wasn't used for those
circuits. This lets me narrow down the set of circuits you might have
(Incidentally, a directory guard can probably tell how many other
functional directory guards you have based on what fraction of the
descriptors it serves you. It can probably even tell when one of your
other dirguards is down, based on when it gets asked for more
descriptors on a timeframe that implies that this is a retry. Not sure
the best way to build an attack out of that.)
> So, any games we can play to make directory activity look like client
> web activity (especially different types and sizes of web activity) are
> bonus win against the attack that cost us no traffic overhead.
Hm. I think you make an okay argument that doing directory fetches
over the same connections as web traffic *might* make fingerprinting
harder, especially if the directory fetches happen roughly
concurrently with the web traffic. I don't think we can upgrade
this "might" into a "will" without actual experimentation here.
But the analysis I was hoping we could think about was the good old
one about tradeoffs between the two designs here (design A: disjoint
guards and dirguards; design B: dirguards are guards). In your
message, you make a case that there could be benefit to B. I think
you're right, but that's only half the analysis we need. We need to
know whether the benefit from B is likely to be greater than the
benefit from A. To do that, we also need a way to examine both and
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