[tor-dev] Proposal 205: Remove global client-side DNS caching

Nick Mathewson nickm at alum.mit.edu
Wed Dec 19 01:05:08 UTC 2012

On Tue, Dec 18, 2012 at 6:42 PM, Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 06:14:23PM +0000, Julian Yon wrote:
>> (3) Don't bother trying to ascertain the full exit policy, but rather
>> maintain a simple table of exit/IP/port combinations that have been
>> rejected and consult it when building/using circuits. This requires no
>> protocol changes (win!) at the cost of no longer blacklisting dishonest
>> exits entirely. Some mechanism for expiring entries would probably be a
>> good idea, and/or maybe hold it in a circular list so that there's a
>> maximum number.
> I had this same thought while rereading my earlier message: just prepend
> a reject rule for this ip:port to our local version of the relay's
> exit policy.
> It does let the exit "tag" you with an IP:port combo that you'll never
> come back to it with. But that seems a small risk compared to the risk
> of an exit relay with a complex enough policy that it causes clients to
> spend two circuits for fetching each component of web pages.

Good idea!  I've added it to


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