[tor-dev] Tor and BGP integration

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Fri Jun 10 08:33:33 UTC 2011

> this is just a way to encourage network operators
>(who want to play nice) to run more than a middle node without a
> lot of overhead. Or do I misunderstand?

You're fine. I was only speaking of the internet path between the
exit and regular internet services. Such as what happens if a Tier-1/2
props up some fast nodes and might be able to vacuum up Tor traffic
destined to itself. How that would affect the current presumption of reasonably
randomized exit sources of traffic to that AS. Mostly from an abuse jurisdiction
standpoint as it's harder to complain about (or apply policy to) roving exits
halfway around the globe than it is one on your front door. Yet since anyone
can prop up such a server today, it's moot I guess. That leaves just the Tor
traffic skewing to consider. Also similarly mooted.

(My understanding of an adversary being able to effectively force traffic
to a destination through their exit... is weak. But if so, that's the skewing
part of this.)

Would this also mean that ISP's (or users) who deploy such a node
would be more likely to block all other nodes such that all they need
to manage/filter/etc, good or bad, is their own 'peering' node?
Whether such nodes reside in/out of their AS, or use exit
or AS only exit.

Is all.

More information about the tor-dev mailing list