chris at eff.org
Mon Feb 21 22:08:47 UTC 2011
On Feb 21, 2011, at 12:54 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
> I agree that forcing collateral damage is the key here. The current
> code generates `random' certificates, but it's pretty easy to pattern
> match them and there's no collateral damage to doing so.
The thing that seems most correct to me, and most true, and is also likely to look like a lot of self-signed HTTPS hosts, is to just create a cert that looks like what a "good" self-signed cert would look like: a subject name that matches the host's internet-facing identity (IP and/or hostname), with reasonably common cryptographic parameters, and real-ish information in the fields like OU and so on (perhaps automatically culled from hostnames or Tor relay names or something).
As the Observatory shows, self-signed certificates outnumber CA-signed certificates. Fitting in with the self-signed world, of which those CPE things like printers and routers are just a subset, seems reasonable.
I don't know if it's possible to do better than to "just sort of look like a web server with a self-signed cert".
Technology Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation
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