Proposal idea: Automatically promoting Tor clients to nodes
cav at gotadsl.co.uk
Wed Mar 31 14:12:02 UTC 2010
I think related to this, possibly, is some way of differentiating
circuits built to route traffic as a relay / bridge and circuits built
to route traffic as a client ?
It would be good to be able to set hibernation properties to shut the
server down, when its reached some limit, but still have the client
functionality of the Vidalia bundle working.
This ability could dovetail nicely with your idea of auto promotion. It
could mean that all Tor nodes become servers up to the limits specified
in hibernation properties (if they are fast enough nodes) - which then
saves on too much bandwidth being used when its operating as a relay or
I have a Tor server machine with hibernate properties set on it - which
I cannot use as a client when Tor has hibernated, forcing me to have
another machine that I use as a client to the Tor network, with which I
browse the net day to day.
On 31/03/2010 14:26, Steven J. Murdoch wrote:
> I've been working recently on a proposal to increase the number of
> bridges in the Tor network. It describes how Tor clients can
> automatically become bridges, if they are considered to be
> sufficiently reliable and the operator consents.
> Comments and suggestions would be appreciated.
> The current draft is below, and the latest version can be found here:
> Filename: xxx-automatic-node-promotion.txt
> Title: Automatically promoting Tor clients to nodes
> Author: Steven Murdoch
> Created: 12-Mar-2010
> Status: Draft
> 1. Overview
> This proposal describes how Tor clients could determine when they
> have sufficient bandwidth capacity and are sufficiently reliable to
> become either bridges or Tor relays. When they meet this
> criteria, they will automatically promote themselves, based on user
> preferences. The proposal also defines the new controller messages
> and options which will control this process.
> Note that for the moment, only transitions between client and
> bridge are being considered. Transitions to public relay will
> be considered at a future date, but will use the same
> infrastructure for measuring capacity and reliability.
> 2. Motivation and history
> Tor has a growing user-base and one of the major impediments to the
> quality of service offered is the lack of network capacity. This is
> particularly the case for bridges, because these are gradually
> being blocked, and thus no longer of use to people within some
> countries. By automatically promoting Tor clients to bridges, and
> perhaps also to full public relays, this proposal aims to solve
> these problems.
> Only Tor clients which are sufficiently useful should be promoted,
> and the process of determining usefulness should be performed
> without reporting the existence of the client to the central
> authorities. The criteria used for determining usefulness will be
> in terms of bandwidth capacity and uptime, but parameters should be
> specified in the directory consensus. State stored at the client
> should be in no more detail than necessary, to prevent sensitive
> information being recorded.
> 3. Design
> 3.x Opt-in state model
> Tor can be in one of five node-promotion states:
> - off (O): Currently a client, and will stay as such
> - auto (A): Currently a client, but will consider promotion
> - bridge (B): Currently a bridge, and will stay as such
> - auto-bridge (AB): Currently a bridge, but will consider promotion
> - relay (R): Currently a public relay, and will stay as such
> The state can be fully controlled from the configuration file or
> controller, but the normal state transitions are as follows:
> Any state -> off: User has opted out of node promotion
> Off -> any state: Only permitted with user consent
> Auto -> auto-bridge: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently
> reliable to be a *bridge*
> Auto -> bridge: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable
> to be a *relay*, but the user has chosen to remain a *bridge*
> Auto -> relay: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable
> to be *relay*, and will skip being a *bridge*
> Auto-bridge -> relay: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently
> reliable to be a *relay*
> Note that this model does not support automatic demotion. If this
> is desirable, there should be some memory as to whether the
> previous state was relay, bridge, or auto-bridge. Otherwise the
> user may be prompted to become a relay, although he has opted to
> only be a bridge.
> 3.x User interaction policy
> There are a variety of options in how to involve the user into the
> decision as to whether and when to perform node promotion. The
> choice also may be different when Tor is running from Vidalia (and
> thus can readily prompt the user for information), and standalone
> (where Tor can only log messages, which may or may not be read).
> The option requiring minimal user interaction is to automatically
> promote nodes according to reliability, and allow the user to opt
> out, by changing settings in the configuration file or Vidalia user
> Alternatively, if a user interface is available, Tor could prompt
> the user when it detects that a transition is available, and allow
> the user to choose which of the available options to select. If
> Vidalia is not available, it still may be possible to solicit an
> email address on install, and contact the operator to ask whether
> a transition to bridge or relay is permitted.
> Finally, Tor could by default not make any transition, and the user
> would need to opt in by stating the maximum level (bridge or
> relay) to which the node may automatically promote itself.
> 3.x Performance monitoring model
> To prevent a large number of clients activating as relays, but
> being too unreliable to be useful, clients should measure their
> performance. If this performance meets a parameterized acceptance
> criteria, a client should consider promotion. To measure
> reliability, this proposal adopts a simple user model:
> - A user decides to use Tor at times which follow a Poisson
> - At each time, the user will be happy if the bridge chosen has
> adequate bandwidth and is reachable
> - If the chosen bridge is down or slow too many times, the user
> will consider Tor to be bad
> If we additionally assume that the recent history of relay
> performance matches the current performance, we can measure
> reliability by simulating this simple user.
> The following parameters are distributed to clients in the
> directory consensus:
> - min_bandwidth: Minimum self-measured bandwidth for a node to be
> considered useful, in bytes per second
> - check_period: How long, in seconds, to wait between checking
> reachability and bandwidth (on average)
> - num_samples: Number of recent samples to keep
> - num_useful: Minimum number of recent samples where the node was
> reachable and had at least min_bandwidth capacity, for a client
> to consider promoting to a bridge
> A different set of parameters may be used for considering when to
> promote a bridge to a full relay, but this will be the subject of a
> future revision of the proposal.
> 3.x Performance monitoring algorithm
> The simulation described above can be implemented as follows:
> Every 60 seconds:
> 1. Tor generates a random floating point number x in
> the interval [0, 1).
> 2. If x > (1 / (check_period / 60)) GOTO end; otherwise:
> 3. Tor sets the value last_check to the current_time (in seconds)
> 4. Tor measures reachability
> 5. If the client is reachable, Tor measures its bandwidth
> 6. If the client is reachable and the bandwidth is >=
> min_bandwidth, the test has succeeded, otherwise it has failed.
> 7. Tor adds the test result to the end of a ring-buffer containing
> the last num_samples results: measurement_results
> 8. Tor saves last_check and measurements_results to disk
> 9. If the length of measurements_results == num_samples and
> the number of successes >= num_useful, Tor should consider
> promotion to a bridge
> When Tor starts, it must fill in the samples for which it was not
> running. This can only happen once the consensus has downloaded,
> because the value of check_period is needed.
> 1. Tor generates a random number y from the Poisson distribution 
> with lambda = (current_time - last_check) * (1 / check_period)
> 2. Tor sets the value last_check to the current_time (in seconds)
> 3. Add y test failures to the ring buffer measurements_results
> 4. Tor saves last_check and measurements_results to disk
> In this way, a Tor client will measure its bandwidth and
> reachability every check_period seconds, on average. Provided
> check_period is sufficiently greater than a minute (say, at least an
> hour), the times of check will follow a Poisson distribution. 
> While this does require that Tor does record the state of a client
> over time, this does not leak much information. Only a binary
> reachable/non-reachable is stored, and the timing of samples becomes
> increasingly fuzzy as the data becomes less recent.
> On IP address changes, Tor should clear the ring-buffer, because
> from the perspective of users with the old IP address, this node
> might as well be a new one with no history. This policy may change
> once we start allowing the bridge authority to hand out new IP
> addresses given the fingerprint.
> 3.x Bandwidth measurement
> Tor needs to measure its bandwidth to test the usefulness as a
> bridge. A non-intrusive way to do this would be to passively measure
> the peak data transfer rate since the last reachability test. Once
> this exceeds min_bandwidth, Tor can set a flag that this node
> currently has sufficient bandwidth to pass the bandwidth component
> of the upcoming performance measurement.
> For the first version we may simply skip the bandwidth test,
> because the existing reachability test sends 500 kB over several
> circuits, and checks whether the node can transfer at least 50
> kB/s. This is probably good enough for a bridge, so this test
> might be sufficient to record a success in the ring buffer.
> 3.x New options
> 3.x New controller message
> 4. Migration plan
> We should start by setting a high bandwidth and uptime requirement
> in the consensus, so as to avoid overloading the bridge authority
> with too many bridges. Once we are confident our systems can scale,
> the criteria can be gradually shifted down to gain more bridges.
> 5. Related proposals
> 6. Open questions:
> - What user interaction policy should we take?
> - When (if ever) should we turn a relay into an exit relay?
> - What should the rate limits be for auto-promoted bridges/relays?
> Should we prompt the user for this?
> - Perhaps the bridge authority should tell potential bridges
> whether to enable themselves, by taking into account whether
> their IP address is blocked
> - How do we explain the possible risks of running a bridge/relay
> * Use of bandwidth/congestion
> * Publication of IP address
> * Blocking from IRC (even for non-exit relays)
> - What feedback should we give to bridge relays, to encourage then
> e.g. number of recent users (what about reserve bridges)?
> - Can clients back-off from doing these tests (yes, we should do
>  For algorithms to generate random numbers from the Poisson
> distribution, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisson_distribution#Generating_Poisson-distributed_random_variables
>  "The sample size n should be equal to or larger than 20 and the
> probability of a single success, p, should be smaller than or equal to
> .05. If n >= 100, the approximation is excellent if np is also <= 10."
> http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/pmc/section3/pmc331.htm (e-Handbook of Statistical Methods)
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