Bridge stability

Christian Fromme kaner at
Wed Mar 10 18:19:03 UTC 2010

Hi Karsten,

First of all, nice analysis!

On Mon, Feb 15, 2010 at 9:29 AM, Karsten Loesing
<karsten.loesing at> wrote:

> So, are these good news? Personally, I had expected worse results. During most of the time, availability is surprisingly high. An 80% chance of the bridges working even after 96 hours seems fair. That means in 1 out of 5 cases someone needs to send a second e-mail or make a second website request. We might even think (or have already thought) about implementing a bridge update functionality where users go to the bridge authority and exchange their broken bridges for working ones---as long as at least one of their bridges still works.

Would it be possible for someone to tell the bridge authority that a
bridge is down even though it is not? Maybe through a DoS attack? If
this is the case, maybe this thing should be handled with care or
otherwise there's a paranoid theoretical way someone could learn all
bridge addresses.

A way around that, if it is considered realistic enough, would be to
tag some bridges 'private' or so and not to give those out with that
update functionality.


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