Proposal: Two Hop Paths

Fabian Keil freebsd-listen at
Thu May 31 19:36:58 UTC 2007

Mike Perry <mikeperry at> wrote:

> Title: Two Hop Paths
> Version:
> Last-Modified:
> Author: Mike Perry
> Created:
> Obsoletes: 112
> Status:
> Overview:
>   The idea is that users should be able to choose if they would like
>   to have either two or three hop paths through the tor network.
>   This value should be modifiable from the controller, and should be
>   available from Vidalia.

Did you consider (and reject) making the hop count also changeable
through special host names so HTTP users could change it depending
on the URL, or would that be an anonymity problem?

If different guards would be used for different hop counts,
fingerprinting based on the traffic might be easier for a
MITM between the user and most of the guard nodes, but if
the position of the user is constant, that's already
possible in cases like your [1] and the gathered information
("this Tor user is the same Tor user I saw x days ago") is
probably not too threatening anyway.

Of course this should also only be an issue as long as the
proposed leaky-exit method isn't implemented.

Is that correct or did I miss something?

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