karsten.loesing at gmx.net
Wed May 16 18:40:30 UTC 2007
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just some early thoughts...
> Further, if we had an alternate directory, it could gather and merge
> bw-information from every supporting router while trying to prove for
> correctness and even functionality to report lyers could be
> integrated. Another possibility to detect lyers would be to use a
> newly created circuit, measure bandwidth and see if the expected
> results are reached.
The alternative directory, or the usual directory with extended
functionality sounds like the better solution to me. The dissemination
of router information is a task of the directory. Contacting a
"supported" router over Tor and requesting bandwidth information seems
like an unnecessary overhead.
What is that lyer detection about? Who is detecting lyers? And who is
reporting such incidents? Who can you trust? Do you only trust the
directories who do the checks, or can other (non-trusted) nodes report
lyers, too? Maybe you need a clear specification of what you want to do,
because all this trust stuff can become very nasty. But I think that
lyer detection is a vital part of your approach. Or to put it another
way, I could imagine some attacks on an approach that assumes that all
nodes always tell the truth about their bandwidth.
Looks like you have fun! :)
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