Router handles: Nicknames vs IP:port

Paul Syverson syverson at
Wed Oct 1 09:25:05 UTC 2003

On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 04:28:45AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 18, 2003 at 05:34:54PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> > I suggest that we give each router a permanent identity key. This key
> > signs stuff it does, so you can be sure you're talking about the right
> > guy. For example, rather than just self-signed certs for link encryption,
> > the certs should also be signed by the identity key of that router. For
> > our sanity, each router will also have a unique 'nickname' (eg moria or
> > nrl) bound to that identity key. The nicknames will come in handy when
> > we move to a restricted route topology, because the descriptor will need
> > to list adjacent routers.
> Is this crazytalk? Are we opening ourselves up to DoS and anonymity
> issues by letting unapproved routers hook up to us? Can we actually
> envision scenarios where we'd want our users using a router that most
> users don't know about?

Just a quick comment on the last question here (too busy and tired
to respond to all of it). 
Yes. I could imagine scenarios in which there is a subnet where
we want to have OR protections but that we don't want most of the
larger OR network and its users to know about (or at least advertise
about). E.g., one could imagine a "firewall" node behind which
there is an onion routing network that is connected to the rest
of the network just through that point (or some small number of
other points). Please read exactly the right amount into "firewall" ;>)


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