[tor-commits] [Git][tpo/applications/tor-browser][tor-browser-115.11.0esr-13.5-1] 2 commits: fixup! Bug 40562: Added Tor Browser preferences to 000-tor-browser.js

richard (@richard) git at gitlab.torproject.org
Mon May 13 13:34:35 UTC 2024



richard pushed to branch tor-browser-115.11.0esr-13.5-1 at The Tor Project / Applications / Tor Browser


Commits:
b04fa658 by Richard Pospesel at 2024-05-13T13:18:28+00:00
fixup! Bug 40562: Added Tor Browser preferences to 000-tor-browser.js

Bug 241: Move network.proxy.failover_direct=false pref to base-browser

- - - - -
8e9d5e49 by Richard Pospesel at 2024-05-13T13:18:28+00:00
fixup! Firefox preference overrides.

Bug 241: Move network.proxy.failover_direct=false pref to base-browser

- - - - -


2 changed files:

- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
- browser/app/profile/001-base-profile.js


Changes:

=====================================
browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
=====================================
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ pref("network.proxy.socks_remote_dns", true);
 pref("network.proxy.no_proxies_on", ""); // For fingerprinting and local service vulns (#10419)
 pref("network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost", true); // Allow proxies for localhost (#31065)
 pref("network.proxy.type", 1);
-// Bug 40548: Disable proxy-bypass
-pref("network.proxy.failover_direct", false);
 // localhost is already blocked by setting `network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost` to
 // true, allowing users to explicitly block ports makes them fingerprintable; for details, see
 // Bug 41317: Tor Browser leaks banned ports in network.security.ports.banned


=====================================
browser/app/profile/001-base-profile.js
=====================================
@@ -455,6 +455,8 @@ pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.snews", true);
   pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.ms-windows-store", true);
 #endif
 pref("network.proxy.allow_bypass", false, locked); // #40682
+// Bug 40548: Disable proxy-bypass
+pref("network.proxy.failover_direct", false, locked);
 // Lock to 'true', which is already the firefox default, to prevent users
 // from making themselves fingerprintable by disabling. This pref
 // alters content load order in a page. See tor-browser#24686



View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/compare/ca21ab0c1d69d28c339efa9d621ed5ef76f24538...8e9d5e4981ad091df028481d5816cecca5d61fca

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View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/compare/ca21ab0c1d69d28c339efa9d621ed5ef76f24538...8e9d5e4981ad091df028481d5816cecca5d61fca
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